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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
it essentially refuses to recognize the bargaining status of the lawful em-
ployee representative, and instead chooses to impose its settlement by the
skillful and massive use of propaganda, the entire scheme bearing remark-
able similarity to a corporate authoritarianism. Such an approach to collec-
tive bargaining runs head on into the general policy of the Act demanding
that employees be free to participate in decision-making by exercising their
right to bargain collectively over matters affecting the terms and conditions
of their employment. More precisely, Boulwarism collides with the obliga-
tion implicit in both section 9(a) and section 8(a)(5) that the employer
grant the lawful representative of his employees not merely formal recogni-
tion, but the "minimum recognition" necessary for meaningful, joint par-
ticipation in the "shared process" of negotiations.05 In sum, Boulwarism
by its artful use of propaganda and tactics poses a serious threat to free
employee participation in the fixing of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and thus is incompatible with the statutory duty to bargain and the
tradition of collective bargaining itself.
SAMUEL PALISANO
CRIMINAL LAW-DuE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN
STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Appellant, Robert Baldwin, was arrested in New York City on August
10, 1968, and charged with the crime of jostling,' a Class A misdemeanor
punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of up to one year.2 The appellant
was brought to trial in the New York City Criminal Court. Inasmuch as
the New York City Criminal Court Act, section 40, provides "[a]ll trials in
the court shall be without a jury,"a his pretrial motion for a jury trial was
denied. The trial resulted in a conviction and imposition of the maximum
sentence. The judgment was affirmed by both the Appellate Division and
65. General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 194 (1964).
. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.25 (McKinney 1967) provides that:
A person is guilty of jostling when, in a public place, he intentionally and un-
necessarily:
1. Places his hand in the proximity of a person's pocket or handbag; or
2. Jostles or crowds another person at a time when a third person's hand is In
the proximity of such person's pocket or handbag.
Jostling is a class A misdemeanor.
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15(1) (McKinney 1967).
3. N.Y.C. CauM. CT. Acr § 40 provides that:
All trials in the court shall be without a jury. All trials in the court shall be held
before a single judge; provided, however, that where the defendant has been charged
with a misdemeanor . . . he shall be advised that he has the right to a trial in a part
of the court held by a panel of three of the judges thereof. ...
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the Court of Appeals, 4 which held that a defendant is not constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial where the crime he is charged with carries a maxi-
mum possible term of one year. Subsequently, upon defendant's motion the
United States Supreme Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis5
and reversed. Held, where the crime that the defendant is charged with in a
state court carries a possible sentence of more than six months, due process
requires that the defendant be given a jury trial. Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970).
While the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law," 6 the exact meaning and scope of that provision has
proven to be elusive. The Supreme Court initially rejected the proposition
that the Bill of Rights has been incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment and is thus binding upon the states.7 Thus, in Davidson v. New
Orleans,8 where the constitutionality of a state assessment on certain real
estate for the draining of swamp lands was challenged, the Court sug-
gested that a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion"'' was the
wisest means of determining the intent and application of "due process of
law." The basis for such determination was made clear in Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, o where the appellant had been charged with murder, not by indict-
ment as is required by the fifth amendment, but by an information. In
ruling upon the constitutionality of this procedure, the Court rejected the
idea that due process includes the right to indictment. What due process
does require, the Court explained, is adherence to those "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions. ... 11 The same view was expressed in Gitlow v.
New York.12 There, the defendant was found responsible for a "manifesto"
tclvocating the overthrow of the government by violent and unlawful means,
4. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 247 N .E.2d 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1969). The
decision in the present case was handed down together with Hogan v. Rosenberg by the
New York Court of Appeals since both cases dealt with the constitutionality of section 40
of the New York City Criminal Court Act.
5. Baldwin v. New York, 395 U.S. 932 (1969). Supreme Court jurisdiction was based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1969), which provides that the Supreme Court may review the
decision of the highest state court in which a decision could be had, if the decision involves
a challenge to the validity of a state constitutional provision or statute on the ground of
its repugnancy to the United States Constitution, and if the state court has upheld its
validity.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
8. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
9. Id. at 104.
10. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
11. Id. at 555.
12. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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and hence convicted of criminal anarchy under a New York statute. 13 While
upholding the constitutionality of the statute as a valid exercise of the
police power, the Court nevertheless spoke of the freedoms of speech and
of the press, which are protected by the first amendment from abridgement
by Congress, as "fundamental personal rights . . .protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States."1 4 Implicit in this decision was the initial awareness of the Court
that select provisions of the Bill of Rights may be incorporated into the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Adamson v. Cali-
fornia,15 certain statutory provisions were challenged as being repugnant to
the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination. The provisions
in issue permitted the court and counsel to comment on a defendant's
failure to explain or deny evidence against him, and allowed the court and
jury to consider the defendant's refusal to explain or deny such evidence.
In discussing the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment, the Court reiterated that "[t]he due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .. .does not draw all the rights of the federal
Bill of Rights under its protection,"' but only those rights "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."' 7 The development of this reasoning is exem-
plified in a long line of cases, which held it unlawful for a state to abridge
by its statutes the freedomkof speech,' 8 press,' 9 religion,20 peaceful assem-
bly,2' or the right of one accused of crime to the benefit of counsel.22
On the other hand, the Court held that the states were not bound by con-
stitutional guarantees of grand jury indictment,23 trial by jury in civil
cases, 24 nor protection from compulsory self-incrimination. 29
Within recent years, the Court has, through the fourteenth amend-
ment, incorporated an increasing number of provisions of the Bill of Rights
13. Ch. 88, §§ 160, 161 [1909] N.Y. LAws 132 Sess. 141.
14. 268 U.S. at 666.
15. 332 US. 47 (1947).
16. Id. at 53.
17. Id. at 54, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
18. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
19. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
20. See Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
21. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 US. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
22. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
24. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
25. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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on a selective and individual basis.26 In Wolf v. Colorado,27 the defendant,
a physician, was convicted in a state court of conspiracy to commit abor-
tion, even though his appointment books, which were admitted into evi-
dence, had been seized from his office in the course of an unlawful search
and seizure. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, hold-
ing that although the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, evidence so obtained in a state prosecution was admissible in a
state court.28 In Gideon v. Wainwright 29 the petitioner was charged with
breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor
which, under Florida law, was a felony. Petitioner's request for court ap-
pointed counsel was denied, based upon the. Florida practice that counsel
was only provided in cases involving capital offenses. The petitioner was
convicted and sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Subsequently,
he filed a habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction and sentence on
the ground that the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel denied him his
constitutional right to be so represented. The Florida Supreme Court, with-
out an opinion, denied relief.30 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the sixth amendment provision of right to counsel in all crimi-
nal prosecutions is made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and that an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution in a state
court has the right to have counsel appointed for him. And in Pointer v.
Texas,3 1 defendant was arrested and brought before a state judge for a
preliminary hearing on a robbery charge. Although the complaining witness
testified, the defendant, who had no counsel, did not cross-examine the wit-
ness. Defendant was later indicted and tried. The witness had moved to an-
other state and the transcript of his testimony at the hearing was introduced
over defendant's objection that he was denied the right of confrontation.
Subsequently, the defendant was convicted, and the conviction was affirmed
26. E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) ("double jeopardy" protection of
fifth amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to
jury trial); Kolpfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation with opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth
amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment). This theory of selective
incorporation is to be contrasted with the total incorporation doctrine espoused by Mr.
Justice Black, in which due process under the fourteenth amendment means no more and
no less, with respect to the States, than the Bill of Rights means vis-A-vis the national
government. The theory was first announced in Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 47, 68
(1947) (dissenting opinion).
27. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
28. 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926 (1947). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the
exclusion remedy was adopted.
29. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
30. Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (1961).
31. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.8 2 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that,
S.. [t]he petitioner was entitled to be tried in accordance with the
protection of the confrontation guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and
that guarantee . . . is 'to be enforced against the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect
those personal rights against federal encroachment.' 3 (emphasis added)
The Court's increased concern with the protection of individual liber-
ties from encroachment by state action evident in recent cases, is no more
apparent than with respect to the Court's position regarding the right to
trial by jury in state criminal proceedings. The sixth amendment provides
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to trial by
jury.34 The Court's early attitude with respect to the application of this
guarantee to state criminal proceedings is indicated in Maxwell v. Dow35
where the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment did not prevent a state from trying a defendant for a non-capital of-
fense with fewer than a twelve member jury. In the course of the opinion,
however, the Court stated that "[tlrial by jury has never been affirmed to be
a necessary requisite of due process of law."36 Similarly, in Snyder v. Coin-
monwealth of Massachusetts,37 where it was held that the appellant's rights
under the fourteenth amendment were not infringed by the jury's view of
the scene of the murder without the defendant's presence, the Court stated
that:
[State] procedure does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or
to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar. Consistently
with that amendment, trial by jury may be abolished. 8s
Likewise in Palko v. Connecticut, 9 which dealt with the constitutionality
of a statute affording to the state, with the consent of the trial court, the
same right of appeal as the accused, the Court said:
This court has ruled that consistently with the [sixth and seventh]
amendments trial by jury may be modified by a state or abolished
altogether. 40
In Irvin v. Dowd,41 a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court held that a mur-
der conviction handed down by a jury which was not impartial according
32. Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
33. 380 U.S. 400, 406, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
34. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
35. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
36. Id. at 603.
37. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
38. Id. at 105.
39. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
40. Id. at 324.
41. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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to constitutional standards was a violation of the Federal Constitution.
There again, the Court stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not
demand the use of jury trials in a state's criminal procedure."' ' It is clear
from these opinions that the Court did not regard the right to trial by jury
in state criminal proceedings as an essential element of due process of law.
In Duncan v. Louisiana,43 however, the Court reconsidered this posi-
tion. The appellant was charged with simple battery, which, under Louisiana
law, was a misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of two years imprison-
ment and a $300 fine.44 The trial court denied appellant's motion for a trial
by jury on the ground that the Louisiana Constitution allowed trial by jury
only in cases where capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may
be imposed.45 The defendant was convicted and sentenced to 60 days im-
prisonment and a fine of $150.46 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the sixth amendment, as made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, required that defendants who are accused of
serious crimes be afforded the right to trial by jury.47 In defending its posi-
tion in light of its prior assertions to the contrary, the Court noted that
none of those cases in which such assertions were found dealt specifically
with the question of the right to trial by jury in state criminal proceedings.
48
The statements found therein, to the effect that the fourteenth amendment
does not demand the use of jury trials in state criminal procedure, therefore,
were dicta and did not have weight of precedent.49
The major issue raised in Duncan, but left unanswered, was what con-
stitutes "petty" and "serious" offenses for purposes of the right to a jury
trial. The court has long held that "petty" offenses are exempt from the
requirements of jury trial.50 In attempting to separate those offenses that
are "petty" from those which are not, the Court looked both to the nature
42. Id. at 721.
43. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
44. LA. REv. STAT. 14:35 (1950), as amended, LA. REV. STAT. 14:35 (1968).
45. LA. CONST. art. VII § 41.
46. 391 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).
47. Id. at 149.
48. Id. at 154-55.
49. The Court in Duncan specifically rejected the dicta found in both Palho and
Snyder. 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
50. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373
(1966); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts,
282 U.S. 63 (1930); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 US.
621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1926).
But see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CH. L. REv. 245 (1959).
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of the offense 5' and to the severity of the maximum authorized penalty. 2
The more recent trend, however, has been to rely primarily on the length
of possible imprisonment as the most relevant criterion.53 Thus the Court
has held that the maximum authorized sentence of six months is short
enough to permit classification of the offense as "petty,"' 4 but that a two
year possible sentence is "serious," requiring an opportunity for jury trial.55
Within the federal system it has been well established that an opportunity
for a trial by jury must be provided when the maximum possible sentence
exceeds six months.50
In the instant case, the majority initially reaffirmed the Duncan57 deci-
sion as to incorporation through the fourteenth amendment of the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury and then centered on the issue of dis-
tinguishing "serious" and "petty" crimes.0 8 The Court sought "objective
criteria" reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense, 0
and fixed upon the maximum authorized penalty as the most relevant indi-
cator.60 It noted that with few exceptions, crimes triable without a jury in
the American States since the late 18th century were generally punishable
by no more than six months prison terms,6 ' and further, that under present
practice the statute in question was the only instance in 50 states in which
a defendant could be denied the right to trial by jury where the maximum
sentence exceeded six months.62 Relying on such overwhelming uniformity,
the Court reasoned that the proper delineation between "petty" and "se-
rious" crimes was six months!63 While recognizing that from the viewpoint
of the accused, imprisonment for however short a time is serious, the Court
rationalized that the benefit resulting from speedy and inexpensive non-jury
51. See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S,
540 (1888).
52. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Natal v. Louisi-
ana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
53. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966).
54. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966).
55. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1966) provides that:
"Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period
of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense."




61. Id. at 71.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 73-74.
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adjudications outweighed the disadvantages to those accused of crimes within
the now defined "petty" classification.
64
Mr. Justice Black, concurring, rejected the premise that the right to
trial by jury is determined by a distinction between "petty" and "serious"
offenses. Noting that the Constitution guarantees trial by jury "in all
criminal prosecutions"6 5 and "in all crimes," 66 Mr. Justice Black concluded
that the petty-serious distinction is in effect an unwarranted judicial amend-
ment.6
7
Mr. Chief Justice Burger dissented. While agreeing that the right to
trial by jury extended to only "serious" crimes,68 the Chief Justice saw
nothing in the "serious" crime coverage of the sixth or fourteenth amend-
ments that would require the Court to invalidate the statute in question.69
Nor did he feel compelled by the "near uniform judgment of the nation"
to read into the Constitution something not found there.70
Mr. Justice Harlan also dissented,7 ' stating his position that the "in-
corporation" theory implicit in the majority opinion, namely that the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
on a selective and individual basis, is unacceptable.72 To Justice Harlan,
the "incorporation" theory limits the concept of due process by confining
it within the bounds of those rights enumerated in the first eight amend-
ments, 73 and imposes upon the states a rigid uniformity through coerced
conformity to federal standards. 74 In his opinion, the decision in Williams
v. Florida,75 handed down the same day as the decision in the instant case,
demonstrated the Court's recognition of the undesirability of imposing upon
the administration of state criminal justice the logical consequences of
Duncan and the present case under "incorporation." 76 Since incorporation
of the sixth amendment right to jury trial means absorption "jot for jot and
64. Id. at 73.
65. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VL
66. U.S. CoNsTr. art. III, § 2, ci. 3.
67. 399 U.S. at 75.
68. Id. at 77.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan is found in 399 U.S. at 117.
72. Mr. Justice Harlan has reiterated his argument for non-incorporation in a num-
ber of opinions: Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 499 (1966) (concurring opinion); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965)
(concurring opinion); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963) (concurring opinion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
349 (1963) (concurring opinion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
73. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-75 (1968).
74. 399 U.S. at 130.
75. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
76. Id. at 118.
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case by case,"'' 7 the Court in Williams, faced with the prospect of invalidat-
ing the common practice in the states of providing less than a twelve member
jury, sought to temper the effect of the decision in Duncan,7 8 and thus
upheld the validity of the Florida procedure providing six member juries
in the trial of non-capital criminal offenses. In so doing, Justice Harlan
concluded, the Court unfortunately was compelled to dilute the settled
meaning of the federal right to a trial by jury.79
It is evident from the trend of recent decisions that a majority of the
Court has, either through implication or expressly, accepted the incorpora-
tion theory of imposing the 'Bill of Rights upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment.8 0 Further, the extent to which the Bill of Rights
has already been carried over into the fourteenth amendment suggests that
whether such incorporation should be "total" or "selective" is merely an
academic question.8' Moreover, even though it is too early to assess the
effect that Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun will have on future
decisions, given the present composition of the Court, it is unlikely that
there will be a change in its position.
8 2
Although, in terms of immediate effect, the impact of the decision in
the instant case is limited to New York City,8 3 in the future it is likely to
77. Id. at 129.
78. Id.
79. rd. at 138.
80. E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) ("double jeopardy" protection of
fifth amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to
jury trial); Kolpfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation with opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth
amendment protection against cruel and unusal punishment).
81. With the exception of the second amendment right to keep and bear arms, the
third amendment protection against the quartering of soldiers, the fifth amendment pro-
tection of indictment by grand jury, and the seventh amendment right to jury trial in
civil suits wherein the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, all the rightS and
privileges of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
and thus applied to the states.
82. It is interesting to examine the past performance of the Justices in this area. In
those cases cited in note 26, supra, we find the following results: Justice Brennan joined in
the majority seven times; Justice Douglas joined in the majority in five decisions and con-
curred in the remaining two; Justice Black joined in the majority six times and con-
curred in the remaining one; Justice White joined in the majority in four decisions,
concurred in one and dissented in two; Justice Stewart joined the majority in three
decisions, concurred in one, and dissented in the remaining three; Justice Harlan con-
curred in four of the decisions, and dissented in the remaining three; Justice Marshall
joined the majority in both decisions in which he took part (Benton and Duncan). Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun were not sitting on the Court in any of the
decisions. Although not conclusive in any sense, these results do provide some basis for
predicting results in the near future.
83. Recall that at the time of this decision, New York City was the only jurisdiction
in the fifty states in which a defendant could be denied the right to trial by jury where
the maximum sentence exceeded six months. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 (1970).
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have a profound effect upon the administration of criminal justice in those
cities where the circumstances which led to the adoption of the New York
City scheme are duplicated. In this regard, the statistics presented by the
New York Court of Appeals in affirming the present case are significant.
From July, 1966 through December, 1968 the New York City Criminal
Court disposed of 821,368 nontraffic misdemeanor cases, whereas in the
next largest city, Buffalo, the City Court disposed of 8,189 nontraffic
misdemeanors. Although it is true that the population of New York
City is approximately 15 times as large as Buffalo's, the figures still re-
flect an enormous disproportion, since New York City's caseload is more
than 89 times as great. Moreover, only 78 judges were available in the
New York City Criminal Court to hear those 321,368 misdemeanors
whereas in Buffalo there were 12 judges available to hear the 8,189 mis-
demeanors, a ratio of 6 to 1, as compared to the caseload ratio of 89
to 1.84
Thus, the rationale behind the New York scheme was that disadvantages
to the accused were outweighed by the benefits which resulted from quick
and inexpensive non-jury adjudications. If, in fact, the right to jury trial
were dependent upon such a balancing of interest, the inherent logic of
the proposition would suggest that were the New York City caseload to
increase still more, the right-to jury trial could be denied in cases where
the maximum possible sentence exceeded one year imprisonment.8 5 Since
'the Court has held that trial by jury is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,8 6 it is necessary to insure that at some point the demands
of local administrative problems not be allowed to infringe upon that right.'
In deciding the instant case, in terms of present state practice, the Court
could have drawn the line at either of two points: six months,87 or one
year.8 8 Had the line been drawn at one year, it is very likely that the end
84. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 218, 247 N.E.2d 260, 266, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424,
432 (1969). As one New York City Court judge wrote:
This court is the most overworked and understaffed court of any community....
The court is open and does business 365 days a year. This includes Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays.... The day court hours are from 9:30 a.m. to 5 p.m .... [N]ighttime
hours begin at 7:30 p.m. The judge rarely finishes his work before one or two o'clock
the following morning.
,People v. Moses, 294 N.Y.S.2d 12, 21 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1968).
85. It is also logical to conclude that in those areas where administrative problems
are virtually non-existent, the balancing process would call for a trial by jury in all criminal
prosecutions.
86. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The decision in Williams v. Florida, 899
U.S. 78 (1970), left unanswered two important questions regarding the right to trial by
jury. From the decision, it is unclear as to what is the minimum number at which a jury
remains such in a functional sense. Secondly, the Court specifically avoids discussion as to
the degree of unanimity required for a verdict.
87. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 (1970).
88. In most states, the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor is one year. In drawing
the line at that point, therefore, the Court, in most instances, would have made the
"petty" classification synonymous with misdemeanor.
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result would be the denial of trial by jury where jury trials are presently
made available. Thus, the effect of the present case could have been con-
traction rather than an expansion of the right to jury trial. Related with
this is the fact that were the line drawn at one year, the pressure up0i1
criminal courts to reform for the sake of more efficient administration to
that extent would have been diminished. The logic is simple. It is easier
and less expensive to try more criminal offenses to the bench than to add
more judges and expand facilities, in order to cope with problems of backlog
and caseload. Thus, in drawing the line as it has, the Court has not ignored
the practical problems of administering criminal justice in our cities.
Implicit in Baldwin is an admonition to those charged with the adminis-
tration of such systems, that while the problems are real, the solution is
not infringement upon constitutional rights and privileges.89
PAUL A. BATrAGLIA
DIVORCE LAW-DEFECTIvE MEXICAN DIVORCE DECREE ACCORDED NEW
YORK RECOGNITION DUE TO SUBSEQUENT APPEARANCE, THROUGH AN ATTOR-
-NEY, OF PARTY ABSENT FROM THE MEXICAN ACTION
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1938 in the State of New York
and continued to reside there until 1950 when the defendant abandoned
their residence. The defendant obtained a Mexican divorce decree in 1960
by personally appearing before a civil court in Juarez, Mexico. The plain-
tiff did not appear in that proceeding, nor did she receive service of process.'
In 1962 the plaintiff signed a document styled, "Defendant's Special Power
of Attorney,"2 which empowered a Mexican attorney to appear in plain-
89. The Court in Baldwin rather summarily dismissed the proposed three judge
panel provided for by § 40 of the N.Y.C. CRIM. CT. AcT as a sufficient substitute for the
constitutional guarantee of jury trial. The Court suggested that the "primary purpose of
ihe jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by the government." Thus, they con-
cluded, the proposed panel "can hardly serve as a substitute for a jury trial." Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 n.20 (1970).
I. New York will not recognize a Mexican decree in which one of the parties thereto
is neither present, nor served with process. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130
N.E.2d 902 (1955); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 151, 81 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1948), modi-
fying 272 App. Div. 1025, 73 N.Y.S.2d 683 (2d Dep't 1947); Lamb v. Lamb, 307 N.Y.S.2d
318, 321 (Fam. Ct. 1969).
2. The opinion of the Appellate Division gave the following as the relevant text of
the power of attorney:
[T]o appear for and represent me in the divorce action that my husband ...has
instituted against me . . .and to state in my name, that I am in complete conformity
with the judgment which was rendered in the said action, that I submit myself ex-
pressly to the jurisdiction of the Court and that I accept the aforesaid judgment as
final and conclusive; and generally to act . . .with full power of substitution, hereby
ratifying and confirming and holding valid all that my said attorney shall lawfully do
or cause to be done by virtue of these presents.
Ramm v. Ramm, 34 App. Div. 2d 667, 668, 310 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113 (2d Dep't 1970) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
